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RECENT DECISIONS

Criminal Law" Change of Venue In Misdemeanor Cases-In
State v. Groppi1 the defendant was arrested in the City and County of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for violations of a proclamation by the Mayor
of Milwaukee restricting the movement of Citizens in the City. Defendant, long a leader of civil rights movements in Milwaukee, was
2
charged with resisting arrest under Wis. Stat. 946.41(1).
Prior to the commencement of the trial, the defendant moved for a
change of venue on the grounds of community prejudice. The motion
was denied on the grounds that the Wisconsin Statute3 does not provide for a change of venue in a misdemeanor case. The statute provides
that a defendant must be charged with a felony before a defendant
has a right to a change of venue.
After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of resisting
arrest. He was fined $500 and sentenced to six months in the house
of correction. Sentence, however, was stayed, and the defendant was
placed on two years' probation.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, on appeal, held that Wis. Stat. Sec.
956.03(3) prohibits a change of venue in misdemeanor cases and that
such legislative prohibition is not, either on its face or as applied in
this case, a violation of the due process clause of the Wisconsin Con4
stitution or the "equal protection" clause of the Federal Constitution.
The majority reasoned that there is a sufficient difference between a
felony and a misdemeanor which warrants a distinction. They believe
that it would be unusual for a community, as a whole, to prejudice the
rights of any person charged with a misdemeanor since a misdemeanor
does not involve a type of crime which would arouse community pas5
sions against a defendant.
The majority decision further pointed out that the prosecution of
misdemeanors has been simplified as much as possible because society
demands a balance between absolute fairness and the efficient administration of justice.6
141 Wis. 2d 312, 164 N.W.2d 266 (1969).
2 §946.41 RESISTING OR OBSTRUCTING OFFICER: (1)

Whoever knowingly resists or
obstructs an officer while such officer is doing any act in his official capacity
and with lawful authority may be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not
more than one year in county jail or both.
3
VrIS. STAT. § 956.03 (1967).
§ 956.03 CHANGE OF VENUE OR JUDGE.
(3) COMMUNITY PREJUDICE. If a defendant who is charged with a felony
files his affidavit that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county, the court
may change the venue of the action to any county where an impartial trial
can be had. Only one change may be granted under this subsection.
4 State v. Groppi, 41 Wis. 2d at 318-321, 164 N.W.2d at 268-270.
5 Id. at 317, 164 N.W.2d at 268; State ex rel Gaynon v. Krueger, 31 Wis. 2d
609, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966).
6 Id.
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The Right To A Change of Venue As One Method For
Insuring A Fair And Impartial Trial
Generally, all states provide by constitution or statute for a change
of venue in certain cases to safeguard against local prejudices, feelings
and opinions.7 In Wisconsin the right to have the venue changed to
obtain a fair and impartial trial in felony cases exists independent of
any statute.8 The Wisconsin Constitution,9 like the Federal Constitution, 10 guarantees to every accused the right to a fair and impartial trial.
The members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, are not
in agreement as to the validity of a statute which limits or excludes a
change of venue in misdemeanor cases where the misdemeanant does
not have an opportunity to present evidence of community prejudice
in support of his motion for change of venue.1"
Under the majority view, if a motion for change of venue is denied
in a misdemeanor case, as it necessarily had to be under the statute,
then counsel would have to make a motion for a continuance. If there
exists a "reasonable likelihood" that prejudicial news prior to trial
would prevent a fair trial, then the trial judge should continue the
case until the threat abates.1" Also, if a juror has formed an opinion
on material issues which prejudicially affect his judgment, counsel for
the defendant, during the voir dire examination would have to move
to exclude the juror for cause. If there is no cause to challenge a juror,
he can still be excluded by peremptory challenges if he is suspected of
prejudice.13
However, the defendant is not limited to pretrial motions. If prior
to the verdict, counsel determines that one or more of the jurors is
prejudiced by pretrial or trial publicity, then a motion can be made
to withdraw the juror, which if successful, would lead to a mistrial. 4
If the defendant can prove his rights have been prejudiced by pretrial
7See: 1 Ai. JUR. TRIALS, Controlling Trial Publicity § 32 (1964) ; Annot., 10
L. Ed.2d 1272 (1963). For illustrative statutes see: MICH. CoMp. LAWS
ANNOT. § 762.7 (1968); MXE. REV. STATS. ANNOT. Tit. 14 § 508 (1964); ILL.
REV. STAT. ANNOT. Ch. 146 § 18 (1964).

8 State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964).
9 WIs. CONST. art. I § 7: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury ......
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . ..."
11 Chief Justice Hallows concurred in the result but agreed with Justice Heifernan and Justice Wilkie, who dissented from the majority. The position of the
Chief justice was that the right to a change of venue on the grounds of community prejudice was a constitutional right. He viewed the statute as regulatory only and not exclusive. He concurred on the grounds that in this particular case, the error of not granting a change of venue was harmless since the
defendant had no difficulty in selecting and obtaining a satisfactory jury and
one which on the record was not claimed as biased or unfair.
12 State v. Alfonsi, 33 Wis. 2d 469, 147 N.W.2d 550 (1967).
13 NNT¥s. STAT. § 957.03 (1967). See State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 129 N.W.2d
155 (1964) ; Irvin v.Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
14 Oseman v.State, 32 Wis. 2d 523, 145 N.W.2d 766 (1966).
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or trial publicity after a verdict has been rendered, then a motion for a
new trial must be granted. 15 Whether the accused has met his burden
of proving prejudice is a matter to be determined by the trial judge
in the exercise of his discretion. 6
justice Heffernan, in his dissent, maintained that the method consistent with fairness and efficient administration of justice in misdemeanor cases is one that would allow a defendant to present evidence
of community prejudice before the voir dire examination. This method
would allow judicial discretion as to whether or not the accused can
receive a fair and impartial trial in the county where the prosecution
is pending. Moreover, under Sheppard v. Maxwell,"' the test of community prejudice is not whether an impartial jury can or cannot be
impanelled, but whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that community prejudice exists.
The Wisconsin court in State v. Nutley"' has in fact accepted the
conclusion that a voir dire does not necessarily assure a trial free from
the contamination of community prejudice. Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has held that even if a defendant has examined
prospective jurors at length during a voir dire, and even if the jurors
state they will evaluate the issues only on the evidence presented during trial, a defendant may still be denied a fair trial if prejudicial
pretrial publicity is of such quantitive and qualitative magnitude that
it is probable that jurors predetermined the issue despite their pro9
testations to the contrary.'
In some jurisdictions statutes permit a jury in criminal cases to be
summoned from a county or district other than that in which the prosecution is pending. Consequently, several cases have held, or have
suggested, that under certain circumstances, the trying of a criminal
prosecution by a jury summoned pursuant to law from a different
county or judicial district from that in which the trial was heard,
secured a fair and impartial trial for the defendant.2 0 Such an alternative procedure would appear to be consistent with the Court's concern
for absolute fairness in all criminal cases and would not seem to render
inefficient the disposition of misdemeanor cases.
Of course, this type of procedure should be undertaken only after
sufficient evidence reveals community prejudice against the defendant.
However, the apparent refusal on the part of judges to hear evidence
5

§ 958.06 (1967).
26 State v. Laabs, 40 Wis. 2d 162, 161 N.W.2d 249 (1968) ; State v. Stevens, 26
Wis. 2d 451, 132 N.W.2d 502 (1965). See also, Marshall v. U.S., 360 U.S.
(1959).
17 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
28 24 Wis. 2d 527, 565-67, 129 N.W.2d 155, 172 (1964).
1 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) ; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
20 Ky. REv. STATS. ANNOT. § 29.262 (1969) ; N.J. STATS. ANNOT. § 24:76-1 (1952);
see also Annot., 102 A.L.R. 1038 (1936).
1 WIs. STAT.
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on community prejudice solely because they conclude the statute gives
them no jurisdiction to order a change of venue in misdemeanor cases,
apparently would preclude such action. 21
Pamplin v. Mason-A Different Conclusion
The constitutionality of denying a change of venue in a misdemeanor
case on the basis that the statutes provide for a change of venue only
in felony cases has been successfully challenged.
In Mason v. State22 the defendant moved for a change of venue and
alleged that he could not have a fair and impartial trial because of
community prejudice. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds
that the Texas statutes did not provide for a change of venue in misdemeanor actions.23 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed,
holding that statutes which do not provide for a change of venue are not
unconstitutional.
The defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court.L2 4 The petition alleged that the petitioner was
being held in violation of his rights under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in that he was denied a hearing in the trial
court on his motion for change of venue. The district court granted
the petition and reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
The district court held that where the totality of the surrounding
facts necessitates a change of venue it becomes the duty of the judiciary to provide for a change of venue in any criminal prosecution,
even if such an order is contrary to a statute. To do otherwise would
be a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution of the
United States.25 To avoid violating the Constitution of the United
States, the court argued, a court must hear any proper and competent
evidence which may be offered in support of, or in opposition to, a
motion for a change of venue in a misdemeanor action as well as in a
26

felony prosecution.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the district court
decision held that the same Constitutional safeguard of an impartial
jury is available to a man denied his liberty for a misdemeanor as for
2'Dissenting Opinion, State v. Groppi, 41 Wis. 2d at 325-26, 164 N.W.2d at 273.
22 375 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
23 Texas had uniformly denied the right of a defendant to a change of venue
based on community prejudice in misdemeanor actions. See Annot., 38 ALR2d.
738, 740 (1954).
24. Mason v. Pamplin, 232 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Texas 1964).
25Id.
at 542; see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) ; accord., State ex rel Ricco
v. Biggs, 198 Ore. 413, 255 P.2d 1055 (1953). In Biggs the Oregon Supreme
Court decided that a failure to provide for a change of venue in misdemeanor
cases violated the Oregon Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the
2 6 United States Constitution.
M ason v. Pamplin, 232 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Texas 1964).
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prejudice is to be applied by judges hearing evidence on motions for
change of venue.2 8 The test is no longer whether prejudice found its

way into the jury box at the trial, but is now the following:
"Where outside influences affecting the community's climate of
opinion as to a defendant are inherently suspect, the resulting
probability of unfairness requires suitable procedural safeguards,
such as a change of venue, to assure a fair and impartial trial."2 9
The position of the Texas state courts in Mason and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Groppi, represent the minority view.30 However,
they are not alone. Other courts have held that a denial of a change of
venue in misdemeanor cases does not violate state constitutional provisions.3 1 Similarly, a number of cases have denied change of venue on
the ground that state statutes failed to provide for such a change on
32
the facts presented.
Conclusion
What is significant about other jurisdictions, which was not commented upon by the majority in Groppi, is that the legislatures in at least
two other jurisdictions which had denied the right of a change of
venue in misdemeanor cases, had recently amended their respective
statutes to permit a change of venue based on community prejudice in
all criminal actions.3 3 Currently, only a few jurisdictions-Minnesota,
Iowa and Massachusetts-which have statutes similar to Wisconsin
Statute §956.03(3) (1967), have not amended their criminal venue
statutes to allow a change of venue based on community prejudice in
all criminal actions.34 This leads one to the conclusion that many legislators are of the opinion that the administration of a criminal court system
would not necessarily break down by permitting motions for change
of venue to be heard in misdemeanor and felony prosecutions. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized the belief that allowing
27 Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1 (5 Cir. 1966). See also, Harvey v. Mississippi,
340 F.2d 263 (5 Cir. 1965) (90 day sentence) ; McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d
106 (5 Cir. 1965) (6 month sentence).

a felony.27 The court of appeals also ruled on what test of community

28 Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1 (5 Cir. 1966) ; for United States Supreme Court
decisions concerning change in test of community prejudice see, Irvin v. Dowd,
366 717 (1961) ; Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) ; Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965) ; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
29
Pamplin
v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1 (5 Cir. 1966).
30
Annot., 38 ALR2d 738 (1954).
31 State ex rel Clark v. Cowen, 29 Idaho 783, 162 Pac. 674 (1916); Commonwealth v. Sacarakis, 196 Pa. Super. 455, 175 A.2d 127 (1961).
32
ashington v. State, 101 P. 863 (1909); State ex rel Carpenter v. Backus,
165 Wis. 179, 161 N.W. 759 (1917).
33 For example, see Tgx. CODE CaITA. PROC. ARTS. 31.01-31.03 (1965) ; PA. STAT.
Tit. 19 § 551 (1965) ; VT.STAT. Tit. 13 § 4631-38 Am. (1969).
CODE ARTs. 75, 844 (1969); PA. STAT. Tit. 19 § 551 (1965); VT. STAT. Tit. 13
§ 4631-38 Am. (1969).
34 i''INN. STAT. § 627.01 (1967) ; IOWA STAT. § 778.01 (1962) ; MAss. GEN. LAws
Ch. 277 § § 51-53 (1956).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

a change of venue based on community prejudice in misdemeanor cases
would be too great a burden on the administration of a criminal court
system.
Nevertheless, in November of 1969 the Wisconsin legislature
adopted the new Wisconsin Code of Criminal Procedure and changed
the venue statute.3 5 The new code provides that a defendant in a
criminal action may move for a change of place of trial if community
prejudice would prevent a fair and impartial trial. 36 This statute does
not state that a defendant charged with a felony may so move, or that
only a defendant charged with a felony may so move, rather it states
that any defendant may so move. While the Reporter's notes do not point
out the following, in effect the new statute changes the rule enunciated
in Groppi. As of July 1, 1970, a defendant in a misdemeanor action
does have a right to be heard on a motion for a change of venue in
Wisconsin.
Ultimately the right to a change of venue in all criminal cases may
be mandatory whether or not a statute provides such right for any
defendant. The United States Supreme Court has granted a stay of
execution and certiorari to Father Groppi. The Supreme Court will
probably consider the policy issue of whether permitting all criminal
defendants to be heard on a motion for a change of venue will impair
the administration of justice.
DALE D. MILLER

35 WISCONSIN LAWS OF 1969, ch. 255. This chapter was introduced in the 1969
3

Assembly as Assembly Bill 603. It was published on December 20, 1969.
§ 971.22 CHANGE OF PLACE OF TRIAL.

6 WIs. STAT.

(1) The defendant inay move for a change of the place of trial on the ground
that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county. The motion shall be made
at arraignment, but it may be made thereafter for cause.
(2) The motion shall be in writing and supported by affidavit which shall state
evidentiary facts showing the nature of the prejudice alleged. The district
attorney may file counter affidavits.
(3) If the court determines that there exists in the county where the action
is pending such prejudice that a fair trial cannot be had, it shall order that the
trial be held in any county where an impartial trial can be had. Only one
change may be granted under this subsection. The judge who orders the
change in the place of trial shall preside at the trial. Preliminary matters prior
to trial may be conducted in either county at the descretion of the court. The
judge shall determine where the defendant, if he is custody, shall be held and
where the record shall be kept.

